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Exercising Passive Personality Jurisdiction Over
Combatants: A Theory in Need of a Political
Solution
ERIc TALBOT JENSEN*
Abstract
On March 4, 2005, a car carrying Nicola Calipari and Andrea Carpani, members of the Ital-
ian Ministry of Intelligence, and Giuliana Sgrena, a journalist who had been taken hostage one
month before and who had just been released and was on her way back to Italy, was traveling to the
Baghdad Airport. The car was fired on by U.S. forces from a checkpoint, killing Mr. Calipari and
wounding Ms. Sgrena and Mr. Carpani.
As a result of this tragic event, a joint investigation occurred, but Italy and the United States
could not agree on the results. The United States determined that the soldiers involved had acted
appropriately. Italy disagreed, and on February 7, 2007, Mario Lozano, a U.S. Army National
Guardsman, was indicted by Italian prosecutors who declared that Lozano could be tried in absentia
because the case was "political."
The trial occurred, and the decision was announced on October 25th. Judge Gargani ruled that
the law of the flag, or the law of the soldier's sending state, prevails over a claim of passive person-
ality jurisdiction in a case like this. This paper analyzes Judge Gargani's decision and determines
that he is correct. Absent another international agreement, the exercise of passive personality crim-
inal jurisdiction over a combatant for combatant acts is inappropriate when the combatant's sover-
eign is seized of the case. Rather, because the combatant is acting on behalf of the sovereign, any
claim against the combatant should be resolved through political means.
In brief, between the criterion of passive authority and that of the flag there can be no
doubt that the latter, also taking the contigent [sic] situation, which is provisional and
* Lieutenant Colonel, Chief, International Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S.
Army. B.A., Brigham Young University (1989); J.D., University of Notre Dame (1994); LL.M., The Judge
Advocate General's Legal Center and School (2001); LL.M. Yale Law School (2006). Operational Law
Attorney, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia, 1996. Command Judge Advocate, Task Force Able Sentry, Macedonia,
1997. Chief Military Law, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia, 1998. Professor, International and Operational Law
Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2001-2004. Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate, 1st Cavalry Division, Baghdad, Iraq, 2004-2005. Member of the Bars of Indiana and the United
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limited in time, prevails absolutely, not only because it is in harmony with the cus-
tomary norm, but because it complies with the principle of reciprocity, the
strongpoint of international law.'
On March 4, 2005, Nicola Calipari and Andrea Carpani, members of the Italian Ministry
of Intelligence, were traveling to the Baghdad Airport. With them in the car was Giuliana
Sgrena, a journalist on her way back to Italy who had been taken hostage one month
before and had just been released. The court summarized the events of the day as follows:
At 20.45 hours the car, while entering Route Irish, was struck by a beam of light and
immediately afterwards by gunshots, coming from one side of the road, which fatally
wounded Calipari. The latter was sitting on the back seat beside Ms. Sgrena, and having
become aware of the danger he placed himself in front of her, shielding her with his body.
Both Ms. Sgrena and Carpani were wounded.
The gunfire came from US soldiers who had organised, acting on the orders of the high
command, a checkpoint that was not planned on a permanent basis but had instead been
set up that evening in order to secure the transit of the convoy in which US Ambassador
Negroponte was to travel. 2
As a result of this tragic event, on February 7, 2007, "Judge Sante Spinachi granted an
indictment request made seven months [prior] by prosecutors"3 against Mario Lozano, an
Army National Guardsman in the rank of Specialist (SPC). The Italian prosecutors ar-
gued that the case was "political" because it involved several agents of the Italian state,
meaning that "Lozano [could] be tried in absentia." 4
As was made clear by the Italian court in its October 25 decision, the issue in this case
was never one of who fired the shots that killed Mr..Calipari, and wounded Ms. Sgrena
and Ms. Carpani; as the court stated:
In point of fact, it has never been denied that the shots that hit the aforementioned
victims were fired by the American soldier Mario Luis Lozano, the accused..., who
is a member of the New York Arm [sic] National Guard, a US military corps that was
part of the multinational force deployed in Iraqi territory.5
Rather, the issue was whether SPC Lozano was criminally responsible for the actions he
took on that evening. This point was clearly stated by U.S. Congressman Vito Fossella:
The friendly-fire death of Mr. Calipari is a tragedy, and we offer our condolences to
his family and the Italian people,.... However, his death was not murder - and Spc.
Lozano should not be tried in abstentia for a criminal act that he did not commit.
Spc. Lozano was forced to take action because Calipari's vehicle failed to obey his
repeated requests to stop. We are told that it sped through the warning line, the
danger line and into the kill line. Lozano had no way of knowing who was in the car
1. Italy v. Lozano, Rome Court of Assize, 25 Oct. 2007, n. 5507/07 (E. A- Stace, trans.) (translation on file
with author), 13.
2. Id. at 3.
3. Judge Orders Indicts of U.S. Soldier in Calipari Case, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SERV., Feb. 7, 2007, available
at LEXIS, CURNWS File (News, Most Recent Two Years).
4. Id.
5. Lozano, supra note 1, at 3.
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and, therefore, he had every reason to believe it could be a car bomb racing to kill
American soldiers and innocent Iraqis.6
After the incident, a joint Italian-U.S. commission investigated the incident but could not
agree on the findings. 7 The United States "cleared its troops of any wrongdoing"8 and
asserted that "[t]he soldiers stuck to the rules of engagement for this sort of situation and
therefore no action should be taken against them."9 Despite this U.S. position, the case
came to trial in Italy on September 27, 2007, where SPC Lozano's attorney, Alberto Bif-
fani, argued that "members of the multinational forces operating in Iraq [were] under
'exclusive jurisdiction' of the country that sent them."' 0 After arguments on jurisdiction,
the trial was adjourned until October 25, 2007, when the judge "ruled that Italy had no
jurisdiction in the case.""
As seen in the quote that began this article, Presiding Judge Gargani ruled that the law
of the flag, meaning the law of a soldier's sending state, prevails over a claim of passive
personality jurisdiction in a case like this. On June 19, 2008, the ruling was subsequently
upheld on appeal at the Court of Cassation, Italy's highest court of appeal. 12 This paper
will analyze Judge Gargani's decision and determine that his ruling is correct. Absent
another international agreement, the exercise of passive personality criminal jurisdiction
over a combatant for combatant acts is inappropriate when the combatant's sovereign is
seized of the case. Rather, because the combatant is acting on behalf of the sovereign, any
claim against the combatant should be resolved through political means.
This paper will initially look at Judge Gargani's ruling in greater detail, highlighting the
reasoning for his decision. Section II will then review types of jurisdiction in general, with
special emphasis on passive personality jurisdiction and its historical application, conclud-
ing that passive personality jurisdiction is a viable form of jurisdiction that is gaining pop-
ularity in modern international and domestic law. Section Iml will review the role of the
military within the international system based on state sovereignty and how this relation-
ship shapes the potential criminal liability of members of the military. Section 1V analyzes
whether Judge Gargani properly applied the principles of passive personality to the situa-
tion of a soldier in a combat environment and concludes that he did. The paper will
conclude with some suggestions for resolving such jurisdictional conflicts in the future.
6. Rep. Fossella Steps Up Pressure on Italian Government to Block Trial In Absentia of US Service Member,
STATES NEWS SERV., Apr. 11, 2007, available at LEXUS, CURNWS File (News, Most Recent Two Years).
7. Lozano, supra note 1, at 4.
8. Accused US Soldier Defends Self, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SERV., June 20, 2007, available at LEXIS,
CURNWS File (News, Most Recent Two Years).
9. Id.
10. Marta Falconi, Trial of US Soldier Charged with Murder of Italian Agent in Iraq Resumes in Rome, Associ-
ATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Sept. 27, 2007, available at LEXIS, CURNWS File (News, Most Recent Two
Years).
11. Court Throws Out Case Against US Soldier Charged Over 2005 Killing of Italian in Iraq, AssocIATEo
PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Oct. 25, 2007, available at LEXIS, CURNWS File (News, Most Recent Two Years).
12. Italian Court Quashes Case of US Soldier Who Killed Secret Agent, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 19, 2008,
available at LEXIS, CURINTWS File (News Most Recent Two Years).
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I. Judicial Decision
As noted above, the case before Judge Gargani involved a charge of murder of an Italian
citizen in Iraq during an armed conflict by a uniformed combatant of another sovereign,
the United States. These facts weighed heavily in Judge Gargani's decision. After detail-
ing the facts of the case, Judge Gargani points out very clearly that "[tihis is the context in
which the events in question here took place; a context qualifiable as armed conflict in a
broad sense." 13 He further clarified his reasoning by stating, "[tihe doctrinal sources are
all in agreement on ascribing a broad meaning to the concept of armed conflict."14 Con-
cluding that international law applied to this case because of its setting in an armed con-
flict, he quoted Article 10 of the Italian constitution, which states, "Italian laws conform to
the generally recognized tenets of international law." s5 Judge Gargani then spent the rest
of the decision determining what international law applied to the case and applying it to
the facts.
As the initial issue in the case was jurisdiction-whether Italy had jurisdiction to try a
foreign soldier for acts committed during an armed conflict-Judge Gargani examined the
different types of jurisdiction recognized under international law, including passive per-
sonality jurisdiction, which the prosecutors were claiming applied in this case. After de-
fining passive personality jurisdiction as "attribut[ing] such jurisdiction to the State to
which the victim belongs,"16 Gargani stated that "although it is not possible to identify
any order of rank amongst the [various forms of jurisdiction], that of passive [personality]
jurisdiction cannot be placed among the first-ranked." 17 After acknowledging that the use
of passive personality jurisdiction had increased, particularly in the cases of terrorism and
organized crime, Judge Gargani stated that, in the context of an armed conflict, there is an
"exclusive basis"18 for jurisdiction: 
-that of the flag state. Gargani wrote:
There is in fact a customary norm of international law, meaning one that is applicable
even if not foreseen in any treaty or agreement, based on the principle of so-called
flag state jurisdiction. This is an uncontested legal principle which has been applied
for centuries, according to which military contingents, when outside their own coun-
try whether under wartime or peacetime conditions, are answerable exclusively to
their own laws and to the State to which they belong... . Independently of any provi-
sion established by treaty or convention, the right of the nation of origin to exercise
its jurisdiction over troops of its own deployed in foreign territory has always been
recognised. This establishes a regime of substantial and total jurisdictional immunity
for foreign forces, comprised in the framework of the doctrine of occupation belli,
above all in relation to the fact that the state organisation of an occupied country, in
the great majority of cases, lacks any effective independence.
A strong principle indeed, whose justification lies in its specificity (its context is warfare
or quasi-warfare) and which is in fact in contrast with, or rather supersedes and partially
13. Lozano, rupra note 1, at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 9.
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annuls the principles foreseen on a general basis, that of territoriality and all the others,
and which is also related to that of reciprocity, because in the case of several countries
jointly participating in a war operation each of them holds jurisdiction over its own
contingent.' 9
Next, Judge Gargani wrote about Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and asserted
that they are in "harmony with this customary law"20 affording jurisdiction over combat-
ants to the sending state. The decision then discussed the model U.N. SOFA, which
states that military members involved in U.N. peacekeeping missions "shall be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States." 21 Judge Gargani then
reviewed various U.N. Security Council Resolutions that dealt with the status of forces in
Iraq and pointed out that, in U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's letter that was at-
tached to Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, "contributing states have respon-
sibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel." 22 Judge Gargani added:
This expression means that it is the participating States who assume the responsibility
of taking penal action against the persons who have committed a crime, when the
perpetrators are members of the respective contingents sent by nations in question.
The latter assume responsibility, but not the obligation, to prosecute them, as is the
case in Anglo-Saxon legal systems, in which the obligatory character of penal action is
not foreseen. 23
This reasoning led to his conclusion that flag-state jurisdiction prevails in time of war over
the claim of passive personality jurisdiction.
For further support of his decision, Judge Gargani catalogued six recent military opera-
tions where the sending states were given exclusive jurisdiction over their military mem-
bers24 and reviewed Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, which is still in effect, and
states : "The Sending States of MNF Personnel shall have the right to exercise within Iraq
any criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of that Sending
State over all persons subject to the military law of that Sending State. 25
Finally, recognizing that the United States, though claiming to have cognizance of the
situation, had not in fact taken any disciplinary action against SPC Lozano, Judge Gargani
concluded that:
[even if] the sender-nation does not exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, its non-exercise
does not entail any possibility of a concurrent jurisdiction taking its place. . .The
customary norms and UN resolutions we have examined, while giving jurisdiction to
19. Id. at 9-10.
20. Id. at 11.
21. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-
Keeping Operations, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 594th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990); Jaune
Saura, Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability ofinternational Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Oper-
ations, 58 HASMNGS LJ. 479, 485-486 (Feb. 2007).
22. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GEN/NO4/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdfOpenElement.
23. Lozano, supra note 1, at 13.
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17, Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
MN'F-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, June 27, 2004, § 2(4), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.
org/regulations/20040627_CPAORDI 7_Status_of_CoalitionRe with_.Annex_.kpdf.
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the sender State, do not and cannot oblige that State to conduct a formal trial, but
only to make a decision in keeping with its own domestic legal system. 26
For these reasons, Judge Gargani held that Italian courts do not have jurisdiction to try a
U.S. soldier for alleged crimes committed against Italian nationals during an armed con-
flict in Iraq. Was Judge Gargani right? The paper will now turn to an analysis of Judge
Gargani's reasoning and determine if it is in keeping with current international law.
H. Jurisdiction
Judge Gargani's ruling centered almost exclusively on the issue of jurisdiction under
international law. As mentioned above, the Italian constitution incorporates international
law, and, therefore, Judge Gargani applied the international rules of jurisdiction. The
basis for these international rules of jurisdiction is the practice of states, and they "spring
from customary international law, comity among nations, or domestic 'conflict of laws'
principles." 27
A. TYPES OF JURISDICTION
Customary international law recognizes four bases of jurisdiction that provide excep-
tions to exclusive territorial jurisdiction: (1) the nationality principle, (2) the universality
principle, (3) the protective principle, and (4) the passive personality principle. 28 These
same principles are reflected in U.S. theory on jurisdiction. The Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States recognizes five forms of jurisdiction: 1)
territorial jurisdiction, 2) nationality jurisdiction, 3) protective jurisdiction, 4) passive per-
sonality jurisdiction, and 5) universal jurisdiction. 29 Though there is a slight discrepancy
between the description of these bases in Judge Gargani's opinion,30 the important point
26. Lozano, supra note 1, at 17, 19.
27. Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEx. INT'L LJ. 1, 38 (1993).
28. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 291-97 (2d ed. 1973).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STArES § 402 (1987); Jen-
nifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61
La. L. Rev. 681, n.30 (2001) (listing ranking as:
(1) territorial-jurisdiction over conduct where an element or the effect of the crime occurs within
the state's territory; (2) nationality-jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator, no
matter where the activity occurs; (3) protective-jurisdiction over conduct that 'threatens [a] state's
sovereignty, security, or some important government function'; (4) passive personality-jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the victim's nationality; (5) universal-jurisdiction over acts that are universally
condemned "when no other state has a prior interest in asserting jurisdiction.").
30. Lozano, supra note 1, at 8 (where Judge Gargani writes:
The first can be anchored to the principle of absolute universality or extraterritoriality, on the
basis of which the law applies everywhere, by everyone and against whoever is the perpetrator of
the act that is penally relevant for the national State.
The second is that of territoriality, whereby the State in whose territory the criminal act occurred
has the right to exercise its own jurisdiction
The third attributes jurisdiction to the State to which the perpetrator of the act belongs (active
jurisdiction).
Lastly, the fourth attributes such jurisdiction to the State to which the victim belongs (passive
jurisdiction).
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for this paper is that all three recognize passive personality jurisdiction as a principle
under international law.
Passive personality is not a new doctrine. In fact, it can be traced back to the Middle
Ages.31 Despite its history, it has traditionally not received wide acclaim or acceptance,
particularly in comparison with the other principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. By way
of definition, "[t]he 'passive personality' principle of jurisdiction purports to confer juris-
diction on a state based on the nationality of the victim .... In effect, the passive person-
ality principle allows the punishment of aliens whose acts abroad are harmful to the forum
state's nationals." 32
Until recently, passive personality jurisdiction has been highly disfavored by Western
nations,33 particularly by the United States.34 This view is typified by the Cutting case
involving the United States and Mexico. 35 A. K. Cutting was accused of criminal libel in
Mexico against Emigdio Medina, a Mexican citizen. Upon charges being filed in Mexican
court, Cutting agreed to publish a retraction. Cutting, however, republished his deroga-
tory allegations in the El Paso Herald, a newspaper in Texas, and then circulated copies of
the Herald in Mexico.
As a result, Mexican authorities revived the Mexican criminal proceedings and claimed
that the act of publishing the Herald article was governed by Mexican law. The United
States disagreed and sent word through its minister in Mexico City that Mexico had no
right to assert jurisdiction over Cutting's actions in the United States, arguing that "Mex-
ico's assertion of jurisdiction was 'wholly inadmissible,' and directing the Minister to de-
mand Cutting's immediate release." 36 While other factors contributed to the U.S.
response in Cutting, the case has come to stand for the U.S. rejection of passive personality
jurisdiction. 37 This position would remain the U.S. position for almost one hundred years
after the Cutting Case.
In contrast to the U.S. approach, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in
the S.S. Lotus case that, because there was no "rule of international law" specifically limit-
ing a state's claim of jurisdiction, Turkish courts were free to extend jurisdiction to the
31. Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan Stigall, The Myopia ofU.S. v. Martinelli: Extraerritorialpirisdiction in
the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. L'T'L L. REv. 1, 25-26 (2007). But see Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights
Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. Itrr'L L. 211, 265 (2005) (where the
author states, "[plassive personality jurisdiction - jurisdiction based on injury to a state's citizens sustained
while outside the state's territory - was practically unknown in international law until a few decades ago.").
32. Edmund S. McAlister, The Hydraulic Pressure of Vengence: United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Case
for a Justifiable Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 449, 459-60 (1994).
33. Patrick L. Donnelly, Estraterritorial Jurisdiction OverActs of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Dip-
lomatic Security andAntiterrorism Act of1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 599, 602 (1987); McAlister, supra note 32,
at 459-60. (where the author states: "[a]s a principle, it is the least justifiable of the jurisdictional bases, and
scholars have historically been uncomfortable with its application. The source of the scholarly discomfort
with the passive personality principle is its potential for producing preposterous results. If the victim's na-
tionality were the sole criterion for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, the presumably every purse-snatch-
ing or bar fight that befell a state's national abroad would confer jurisdiction on the victim's state.").
34. Watson, supra note 27, at 4.
35. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORAL CRIME AND THE CUTTING CASE (1887);
Cf Watson, supra note 27, at 4-7 (quoting the Dept. of State Report and discussing the Cutting case); Blake-
sley & Stigall, supra note 31, at 26-27.
36. Watson, supra note 27, at 6.
37. Id. at 7.
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perpetrators of crimes against Turkish nationals. 38 The specific holding of this case was
later rejected in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 39 which withheld jurisdiction in a
similar case to a ship's flag state or the nation of the perpetrator; but it was a move toward
recognition of passive personality jurisdiction, which eventually gained much broader
acceptance.
In the 1930s, a Harvard Research group found that there were at least twenty-five coun-
tries that recognized the principle of passive personality jurisdiction in their criminal
codes. 40 The study concluded, however, that "passive personality without qualifications
has been more strongly contested that any other type of competence." 41 Despite this
conclusion, as will be discussed below, the move toward international acceptance of pas-
sive personality jurisdiction, at least with respect to certain actions, is steadily increasing.
B. HIERARCHY OF JURISDICTION
Judge Gargani's determination that "it is not possible to identify any order of rank"
amongst the various theories of jurisdiction is not a universally held view. Passive person-
ality jurisdiction has been variously described as "the most aggressive" 42 or "exotic" 43 form
of jurisdiction and certainly the most controversial. 44 Arguing in one of the seminal trea-
tises on the subject, Prof. Geoffrey Watson commented:
mhe international community would likely still favor the offender's home state [to
exercise jurisdiction], presumably for the same reasons that extradition treaties permit
states to deny extradition of their nationals regardless of the defendant's preferences.
There is some sense, particularly among civil-law states, that a state should have the
paramount right to decide when to deprive its own citizens of liberty, and that this
right transcends even the right of states to enforce violations of law within their own
territory. 45
As demonstrated by the Cutting case mentioned above, both states and scholars have stated
that, when a nation applies its jurisdiction extraterritorially, it must be based on a stronger
claim than that of the citizen's state or the state where the crime occurred. If not, "the
state must still show that the alleged offenses violate international norms and agreements
in order to justify the violation of another state's territorial sovereignty" 46 and the applica-
tion of passive personality jurisdiction. This led Prof. Watson to conclude in 1993 that
38. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 13 (Sept. 7), available at http://www.world
courts.Com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_jotus/.
39. See Convention on the High Seas of 1958, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8--1958-high-seas.pdf
40. Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 578 (Supp. 1935).
41. Id. at 579.
42. Eric Cafritz & Omer Tene, Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code: The Passive Personality Principle, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 599 (2003).
43. Watson, supra note 27, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 21. Professor Watson further stated that "[p]assive personality jurisdiction does not clearly serve
any interests furthered by territorial or nationality jurisdiction." Id. at 18.
46. Gregory S. McNeal & Brian J. Field, Snatch-and-Grab Ops: Yoitifying Extraterritorial Abduction, 16
TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNrErMP. PROBS. 491, 500 (2007).
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passive personality jurisdiction should be "treated as a residual form of jurisdiction, to be
exercised only if no state claims territorial or nationality jurisdiction. '47
Views on jurisdiction, however, have been changing since 1993, and Judge Gargani may
have been anticipating an international trend, especially in specific cases. As one com-
mentator states, the "least accepted theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the passive
personality principle .... This form of jurisdiction has not been generally accepted for
torts and crimes, but is becoming more accepted for acts of terrorism and other 'organized
attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality."48
In fact, many scholars now seem to agree that at least territoriality and nationality are
more traditional and apply to a broader set of facts, but that passive personality has its
place in international law as well.
Territoriality and nationality clearly are accepted as the most traditional bases for a
state to assert jurisdiction, but increasingly states have replaced these rigid concepts
with "principles of reasonableness and fairness" reflecting "transformations in global
communications, in the level and variety of transnational activity, and in perceptions
of the way states interact with one another." The result has been an increase in the
use of protective, passive personality and universality principles as a means of assert-
ing jurisdiction over crimes previously difficult to punish.49
This idea of increasingly using passive personality to gain jurisdiction in difficult cases is
supported by United States v. Roberts.50 In this case, the court:
upheld the use of the passive personality principle to charge an employee of a cruise
ship with statutory rape after he allegedly engaged in a sexual act with an American
minor while the ship was on the high seas. The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the court lacked jurisdiction. In doing so, the court found that because the
ship began and ended its voyage in the United States and most of its passengers,
including the alleged victim, were American, the passive personality principle pro-
tected Americans abroad without intruding on the interests of another sovereign.5'
The 1986 Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations provides further evidence of a
changing attitude, recognizing that the principle of passive personality jurisdiction was
controversial but had gained some general acceptance in certain circumstances.5 2 Those
times when it has gained some acceptance may be limited, but they do exist and are occur-
ring with increasing frequency.
47. Watson, supra note 27, at 20.
48. Robert J. Lundin M, International Justie: Who Should be Held Respomible jbr the Kidnapping of Thirteen
Yapanese Citizens?, 13 TPANSNAr'L L. & Co,.,riEmp. PROas. 699, 707 (2003) (citations omitted).
49. Kenneth S. Freeman, Punishing Attacks on United Nations Peacekeepers: A Case Study of Somalia, 8 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 845, 859-60 (1994) (citations omitted).
50. United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d. 601 (E.D. La. 1998).
51. Aaron D. Buzawa, Cruising with Terrorism: J urisdictional Challenges to the Control of Terrorism in the
Cruising Industry, 32 TUL. MAR. L. J. 181, 185-86 (2007).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, comment g. (1986).
But see Watson, supra note 27, at 9 (where the author states that as late as 1989, the United States "spoke
against passive personality jurisdiction .. .in a case involving the murder of a United States National in
Korea.").
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C. EMERGING USES OF PAsrvE PERSONALITY JURISDICTION
The most accepted criminal application of passive personality is against terrorist activi-
ties.53 The gradual acceptance of passive personality jurisdiction against terrorism has
proceeded more slowly in the United States than in other parts of the world. For exam-
ple, passive personality jurisdiction appears to be "on the ascendancy" in Europe.54 The
United Kingdom provides for passive personality jurisdiction over terrorists in the U.K.
Terrorism Act 2000.55 Prior to this, "English law ha [d] never before embraced this 'pas-
sive personality principle' of jurisdiction.15 6 Other countries, including Germany, Israel,
Italy, Mexico, Japan, Turkey, and France, have also incorporated passive personality juris-
diction into their domestic criminal statutes for offenses against their nationals while
outside their territorial jurisdiction. 57
U.S. acceptance of passive personality, even in this limited role against terrorism, be-
gan 58 with the acceptance of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
(Hostage Convention), 59 which allows for the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction.
The Hostage Convention's provisions quickly began to have an effect. In United States v.
Yunis,60 the court used passive personality jurisdiction, and specifically relied on the Hos-
tage Convention provisions, to accept jurisdiction over a Lebanese citizen and resident
allegedly involved in a Jordanian civil aircraft with American citizens on board. The Yunis
court also relied on the prior U.S. claim of passive personality jurisdiction when it sought
extradition of Muhammed Abbas Zaiden for the Achillo Lauro incident and the death of
Leon Klinghoffer. 61 These initial uses of passive personality jurisdiction in terrorism
cases have created some momentum within the United States.
Since then, Congress has "adopted several anti-terrorism statutes founded at least partly
on passive personality jurisdiction, though it prefers to call this legislation an exercise of
protective jurisdiction."62 Jurisdiction under the Hostage Taking Act fits under "the pro-
tective principle as well as the passive personality principle" 63 because it applies "when the
53. Ahmad E. Nassar, The International Criminal Court and the Applicability of International urisdiction Under
Islamic Law, 4 Ci. J. IrNsT'L L. 587, 589 (2003) (stating that "[t]he passive personality principle is not 'gener-
ally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes' but it is accepted for 'terrorist and other organized attacks' on
nationals.").
54. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 31, at 129-30.
55. Crime (International Cooperation) Act, (2003) c. 32, § 52 (U.K).
56. Michael Hirst, Murder As An Offence Under English Law, 68 JoCL 315 (2004).
57. Andrew J. Calica, Self-Help is the Best Kind: The Efficient Breach Justification for Forcible Abduction of
Terrorists, 37 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 389, 400 (2004).
58. Andreas Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad The Constitution and International Law, 83 AJ.I.L.
880, 887 (1989) ("[hlere, for the first time, the passive personality principle was contained in a treaty of
general application to which the United States subscribed.").
59. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
60. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp 896, 901-03 (1988).
61. Id. at 902-03; Sicilians Investigate U.S.for Egyptian Plane Intercept, UNIED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 27, 1985,
available at LEXIS, CURNWS File; Matthew A. Slater, Trumpeting Justice: The Implications of U.S. Law and
Policy for the International Rendition of Terrorists from Failed or Uncooperative States, 12 U. ML\IAsi INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 151, 161 (2004); see also Watson, supra note 27, at 11 (stating that "[t]he prosecution of Yunis
and the indictment of Abbas certainly suggest that the United States has begun to accept the passive personal-
ity principle, if only as applied to terrorist crimes.").
62. Watson, supra note 27, at 31.
63. Id. at 10.
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offender or the victim is a U.S. citizen, "64 but it is a clear acceptance of passive personality
jurisdiction. This act was followed in 1986 with the enactment of the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, which made it a crime to murder an American
citizen anywhere in the world.65 Even then, Congress provided limits on the application
of this jurisdictional theory. To counter the broad geographical reach of the law, "the
Act's definition of international terrorism limits the principle's application to a specified
class of crimes."
66
The trend to accept passive personality jurisdiction continues to increase, though in
closely circumscribed situations. In addition to acts of terrorism, "[i]n 1987 Congress
expanded United States jurisdiction to include crimes against Americans 'outside the juris-
diction of any nation' - that is, on the high seas or in Antarctica." 6 7 The 1998 Intergov-
ernmental Agreement on Space Station Cooperation provides for passive personality
jurisdiction. 6 8 In United States v. Benitez, 69 the court seemed to apply passive personality
jurisdiction to a drug case where a Colombian national assaulted, robbed, and conspired to
murder a U.S. DEA agent.,70 and, additionally, the United States uses passive personality
to grant jurisdiction over "war crimes committed against U.S. victims pursuant to the War
Crimes Act."
7 1
Passive personality jurisdiction has also been put forth as a "rationale for U.S. jurisdic-
tion over Saddam Hussein" because of "offenses that he committed against the United
States and coalition forces." 72 At least one author argues for passive personality jurisdic-
tion to apply to environmental standards, 73 and another as a potential means to protect
cultural property. 74 Passive personality jurisdiction was proposed as the means of jurisdic-
tion to enforce laws concerning internet gambling, 7 5 cyber crimes such as sending viruses
64. Yoav Gery, The Torture Victim Protection Act: Raising Issues of Legitimacy, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 597, 619 (1993).
65. Jeanne M. Woods, Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on
Extraterritorial Arrests, 14 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1 (1996).
66. Patrick L. Donnelly, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Dip-
lomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 599, 612 n. 234 (1987).
67. Watson, supra note 27, at 13 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) (1988)).
68. Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member States of the European
Space Agency, the Government ofJapan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of
the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Article 22,
available at ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1998/IGA.html; StacyJ. Ramer, Establishing the Extraterres-
trial: Criminal Jurisdiction and the International Space Station, 22 B.C. INr'L & COMP. L. REv. 323, 336 (1999).
69. United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
70. Bruce T. Smith, Assertion of Adjudicatory Jirisdication by United States Courts Over International Terrorism
Cases, 1991 Ap-sn L. 13, 20 (1991).
71. James Paul Benoit, The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 53 NAVAL L. REv. 259, 313
(2006).
72. See Kenneth C. Randall, Book Review: UniversalJurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives
by Luc Reydams , 98 AJ.I.L. 627, 629 (2004).
73. Browne C. Lewis, It's a Small World After All: Making the Case for Extraterritorial Application of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 2143, 2178-79 (2004).
74. Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes under
the Rome Statute of the ICC, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 857, 878-79 (2005).
75. Michael P. Scharf & Melanie K. Corrin, On Dangerous Ground: Passive Personality and the Prohibition of
Internet Gambling, 8 NEw ENG. INT'L & Comp. L. ANN. 19 (2002). As of the writing of this article, this bill
has not become law.
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over the internet, 76 and the sexual exploitation of children. 77 It has even been proposed in
the case of nuclear proliferators. 78
The international world, however, has moved faster than the United States in this area.
Passive personality jurisdiction was initially suggested for the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 79 It has been used by Italy,80 France,81
the Netherlands, s2 Romania,8 3 Spain,84 Belgium,8 5 and the International Criminal
Court.8 6 Article 5(1) of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 7 requires state parties to estab-
lish jurisdiction for torturers through various methods, including passive personality juris-
76. John Eisinger, Script Kiddies Beware: The Long Arm of U.S. Jurisdiction to Prescibe, 59 WASH & LEE L.
REv. 1507, 1532-33 (2002) (also acknowledging that any such cyber attack would likely provide for other,
more well accepted means of jurisdiction.)
77. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 31, at 156-57.
78. Adam Treiger, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing Nuclear-Expertise Proliferation, 82 GEO.
L.J. 237, 253 (1993).
79. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 102 Star.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see Lee A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States
is in Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425,457 (1999) (where the author states:
[t]he Swedish representative proposed an amendment to the [Genocide Convention] . . . that
would have recognized the passive personality principle of jurisdiction; his proposed amendment
read: 'Furthermore, article VI should not be interpreted as depriving a State of jurisdiction in the
case of crimes committed against its nationals outside national territory.' This proposal enjoyed
support from Syria and qualified support from Egypt, but the United States adamantly oppose it,
arguing that the Sixth Committee did not have the obligation to 'reconcile conflicts of law or to
codify international law in the matter.').
80. See Marco Roscini, Great Expectations: The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy, 5 J. INT'L CUsM.
JusT. 493 (2007) (stating: "Article 10(1) of the Penal Code provides for Italian jurisdiction over non-political
crimes committed abroad by foreigners against the Italian state or nationals if the crime is one for which the
penalty is no less than one year. The perpetrator must be present on Italian territory and the prosecution
must be requested by the Minister of Justice or by the victim.").
81. See Lekha Sriram Chandra, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 301, 337 (2003); Cafritz & Tene, supra note 42, 587 (2003).
82. Chandra, supra note 79, at 362.
83. Moira McConnell, "Forward This Cargo to Taiwan': Canadian Extradition Law and Practice Relating to
Crime on the High Seas, 8 CR1M. L.F. 335, 335 (1997).
84. Jamison G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC,
and a Wake-Up Call for Former Heads of State, 50 CASE. W. REs. 127, 144 (1999); James Paul Benoit, The
Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 53 NAVAL L. REv. 259, 278 (2006); Antonio F. Perez, The
Perils of Pinochet: Problems for TransationalJustice and a Supranational Governance Solution, 28 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 175, 190-91 (2000); Robert C. Power, Pinochet and the Uncertain Globalization of Criminal Law, 39
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 89, 117 (2007)..
85. Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium, 3 J. IrT'L CRiM. JusT. 400 (2005).
86. Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT'L CRLM. JUST. 830 (2006). But see Remigius
Oraeki Chibueze, The International Criminal Court: Bottlenecks to Individual Criminal Liability in the Rome
Statute, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 185, 204-08 (2006); Ariel Zemach, Fairness and MoralJudgments in
International Criminal Law: The Settlement Provision in the Rome Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 895,
900-02 (2003); Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Crimi-
nal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 822 (2003). But see Alejandro E. Alvarez, The Implementation of the ICC
Statute in Argentina, 5 J. INT'L CuIM. JuSr. 480 (2007) (where the author chronicles Argentina's refusal to
extend jurisdiction to allow passive personality when enacting the ICC into domestic law).
87. GA. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc, . A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984).
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diction.88 The 2003 U.N. Convention Against Corruption8 9 "establishes a rather
extensive jurisdictional basis, and in addition to previous treaties it specifically includes
passive personality jurisdiction." 90 The U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime also allows for the use of passive personality in establishing jurisdiction. 91
It seems clear that, particularly within the last several decades, the use of passive person-
ality jurisdiction is increasing. This is certainly true for the crime of terrorism, and it is
gaining greater acceptance for other crimes where it may be difficult to establish jurisdic-
tion otherwise. Even among those who support passive personality jurisdiction, however,
there are calls for caution to insure that the use of passive personality jurisdiction does not
derogate individual human rights.
D. PASSIVE PERSONALTY AND HuMAN RIGHTS
As noted above, U.S. concern over the application of passive personality jurisdiction
rests at least in part with its potential effects on individual human rights. For example:
[m]ore than one hundred years ago, the United States Department of State expressed
opposition to passive personality jurisdiction on the grounds that it would be unfair
to criminal defendants. It would subject individuals "not merely to a dual, but to an
indefinite responsibility"-a responsibility to obey foreign laws as well as United
States laws.9 2
This concern continues today in an era of enhanced concern with individual human
rights. The Yunis court explicitly recognized the potential unfairness of prosecuting a
foreign national for violation of laws of a country of which he was not a citizen. The court
determined, however, that, because the charge was one of terrorism and hostage taking, it
involved "serious and universally condemned crimes [that did] not raise the specter of
unlimited and unexpected criminal liability." 93
Commentators have also recognized this issue and noted that a passive personality re-
gime makes individuals subject to the laws of states with which they may have no familiar-
ity and should not be expected to know. Professor Watson argued that it is "more fair to
the defendant to give preference to the defendant's home state, for the defendant can be
presumed to be aware of his own country's law-or at least can be presumed to be more
familiar with his own country's law than with the law of his victim's state."94
88. Javaid Rehman, The Influence of International Human Rights Law Upon Criminal Justice Systems, 60 JoCL
510 (2002).
89. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/
publications-unodc onvention-e.pdf.
90. Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as an International Crime and Crime Against Humani,, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
466 (2006).
91. G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 15, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 1, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/55/49
(2001); Roger S. Clark, The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 50 WAYNE L.
REV. 161, 179-80 (2004).
92. Watson, supra note 27, at 22 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, REPORT ON EXTRATERR1TORlAL CRIME
AND THE CUTTING CASE, supra note 33, at 840).
93. Yunis, supra note 60, at 902.
94. Watson, supra note 27, at 20. Professor Watson further argues:
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A potential solution to this problem is to require mutual criminality, meaning that an
individual may only be tried under passive personality jurisdiction for crimes that are also
crimes within his or her own state of nationality. 95 Alternatively, if the use of passive
personality jurisdiction is limited to "especially grave crimes[,] ... the offenders should be
aware of the illegality of their actions." 96 While this may be a solution, it has not yet
manifested itself in domestic or international law.
A further argument regarding the rights of defendants would arise in a case like Lozano,
where the accused is being tried in absentia. The exercise of passive personality jurisdic-
tion, particularly when exercised in absentia, presents serious "[elvidence- and testimony-
gathering problems."97 These problems present significant human rights issues, particu-
larly when coupled with the lack of mutual criminality. Human rights advocates have long
deemed in absentia trials to be per se violations of human rights. 98 While Judge Gargani
did not deal specifically with this issue, it is not unreasonable to assume that such consid-
erations informed his opinion.
Regardless of whether the international system eventually requires mutual criminality
and/or only exercises passive personality jurisdiction in the case of serious crimes, Judge
Gargani rightly concluded that passive personality jurisdiction is an increasingly accepted
form of jurisdiction that is gaining in popularity in modern international and domestic
law. The next questions to be addressed are the role of the military within the interna-
tional system based on state sovereignty and how this relationship shapes potential crimi-
nal liability of military members.
III. Sovereignty and the Military
For in the less solemn kinds of war, what the members do, who act under the particular
direction and authority of their nation, is by the law of nations no personal crime in them:
passive personality jurisdiction can be fair to the defendant, but only if applied to defendants who
have reason to know their conduct constitutes a serious crime in the victim's state. For this
reason, passive personality jurisdiction should be limited to serious crimes punishable by signifi-
cant jail terms in both the victim's and the defendant's states. Such a rule would put the defen-
dant on notice, minimize the possibility of disproportionate punishment, and ensure that serious
offenders do not evade prosecution altogether.
Id. at 27.
95. Id. at 16 (where the author argues "[l]ike nationality jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction will
usually be viewed as intrusive when dual criminality is lacking"). The author further argues that "it seems
unlikely that the international legal system will ever approve of passive personality jurisdiction unless there is
at least some element of 'dual criminality' built into it." Id.
96. Ariel Zemach, The Limits of International Criminal Law: House Demolitions in an Occupied Territory, 20
CoN'N. J. INT'L L. 65, 83 (2004).
97. Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling Over Clearly Defined Crimes,
36 GEo. J. INT'L L. 537, 576 (2005).
98. See AMNsESTy INTERNATIONAL USA FAIR TRIALS MANUAL 21.1, http://www.amnestyusa.org/interna-
tional-justicelthe-right-to-a-fair-triaUfair-trias-manua/page.do?id= 1 104744&n 1=3 &n2=3 5&n3=83 5 (follow
"21. The right to be present at trial and appeal" hyperlink) (where Amnesty International states that every
accused has the right to be present at trial and states: "The organization believes that the sole exceptions to
this should be if the accused has deliberately absented themselves from the proceedings AFTER they have
begun or has been so disruptive that they have had to be removed temporarily.").
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they cannot therefore be punished consistently with this law for any act, in which it considers
them only as the instruments, and the nation as the agent.99
This quote is extraordinary, especially because it comes from seventeenth century En-
gland. It reflects a fundamental change that occurred as the nation state became the fun-
damental unit of the international system and began to monopolize violence through
standing armies as a means of establishing legitimacy in both the domestic and interna-
tional sphere. As a result of that consolidation of military power, those armies became the
sovereign's agents; and the sovereign was the only one who could regulate the military,
determine their privileges and immunities, and determine their criminal liability when
acting in obedience to the sovereign's commands.
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDING ARMIES AS THE SOVEREIGN's AGENT
In the centuries after the fall of Rome and the break-up of its empire and before the
formal establishment of the nation state system in the seventeenth century, the medieval
system of raising and disbanding armies prevailed. There were no standing armies, merely
armies at the disposal of the local prince as long as he had enough money to hire them. 100
Prior to the rise of national standing armies, mercenaries were "the dominant armed in-
strument of the State because they were an economic alternative to more expensive stand-
ing armies." 101 These armies, however, often turned on those who hired them, once the
battle was over, and there was no longer a need to pay the gathered forces. 102
Since the beginning of time, communities have excused otherwise punishable behavior
as long as it was done on behalf of society. For example, murder and theft were punisha-
ble by the community, but raiding the neighboring village to carry off its goods or people
was acceptable because it benefited the community. With the rise of the nation state and
the enlarging of the sense of community, to legitimize itself the state had to gain control
of the violence it needed for security. The sovereign achieved this goal by creating a
standing army that functioned at the will of the sovereign. With the establishment of the
nation state and the empowering of a single sovereign, that sovereign became the voice of
the people and the controller of violence, both domestically and internationally. The
King not only prevented violence within his realm, but also directed his standing armies to
commit violence outside his realm to further his objectives. It was the sovereign and the
sovereign alone who regulated his armed forces. 103 In so empowering the army, the sov-
ereign also had to be willing to legitimize the acts of the army in the face of the King's
justice, so long as the army followed the King's command.
B. SOVEREIGN REGULATION OF NATIONAL ARMIES
As states became associated with territory, as opposed to a particular sovereign, con-
scription became more and more effective as a measure of maintaining the standing army.
99. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTrTUTON's TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 225 (2007) (quoting 1 Mat-
thew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 162-63 (1672).
100. PHILIP BOBBT-Ir, TiHE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 81-82 (Alfred A. Knopf ed. 2002).
101. Id. at 331.
102. Id. at 82.
103. Id. at 82.
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In 1620, Sweden's Gustavus Adolphus instituted conscription, as opposed to hiring a mer-
cenary army, because it was cheaper, invoked patriotism in order to encourage sacrifice on
the battlefield, and "relied on a relationship between subject and monarch so that the
duties it imposed were matters of obedience to orders and not interpretations of a
contract."104
This tie to the sovereign soon developed into a very important part of the armed forces.
No sovereign demonstrated this development more effectively than Napoleon. In a time
where 50,000 -man armies were considered very large, Napoleon had almost 700,000
soldiers in the field at his disposal in 1808. Between 1800 and 1815, he mobilized over
two million Frenchmen as part of his Grand Armee. 10 5 And most strikingly, his army was
an army of "Frenchmen" as opposed to a group of vassals who were doing their required
duty to avoid death or punishment or a band of mercenaries who were only attracted so
long as the work was profitable.106 The armies took their directions from the sovereign,
acted as his agent, followed his instructions, and were consequently granted the sover-
eign's license.
A concurrent development with sovereign control of national standing armies was the
formalization and further expansion of the laws of war. Limitations on the use of force
have existed since organized combat,107 and were fairly widespread in almost all developed
civilizations throughout history. 1°8 After the Battle of Solferino and the onset of the U.S.
Civil War (with its 1863 Lieber Code), however ,109 a string of international meetings and
agreements between sovereigns began, which applied stricter rules to the conduct of war-
fare and the protection of those not directly involved in the fighting. These meetings and
agreements include: the 1864 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field (the 1864 Convention),"0 with its accompanying Addi-
tional Articles of 1868; the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg;' the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907;112 the 1906 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field; 113 and the 1909 Naval Conference of
London.'14
While the content of these agreements and meetings was certainly significant for the
members of each nation's military, more important for this paper are the mere facts that
the meetings occurred and that the respective sovereigns were the drivers behind the
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. at 175-76.
107. See William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September I lth Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of
War, 73 Miss. L. J. 639, n.12 (2004); Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARv. IrNr't LJ. 49, n.37 (1994); Gregory P. Noone, The Histo-y and
Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II, 47 NAVAL. L. REV. 176, 182-85 (2000).
108. Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ's "Uganda Wall": A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction and an Entry Point
for Lawfare, 35 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 241, 245-46 (2007).
109. Dir'r~ict SCHINDLER & Jim To, aAN, THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (3rd ed. 1988).
110. Idat 279.
111. Id. at 101,
112. Id. at 63-103.
113. See id. at 301.
114. Id. at 843.
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meetings. It is important to note that when Henry Dunant,115 a Swiss businessman with-
out formal ties to any government or military, wanted to provide better care for the
wounded and sick on the battlefield, he invited sovereigns to a meeting to discuss his
proposals. He clearly recognized that if he wanted to influence the militaries, he would
have to do it through the sovereigns , because it was the sovereigns who made the rules by
which the militaries governed themselves. And, in fact, the 1864 Convention was the
result of a meeting sponsored by the Swiss government and attended by Representatives
from European governments as well as from the United States, Brazil, and Mexico. 116
The role of the sovereign in the development of rules of warfare highlights the fact that
the military is the agent of the sovereign and functions under the permissions and limita-
tions that the sovereign places on it. Through these agreements, the sovereign described
the actions that his military could lawfully take as his agent and clarified that the sovereign
and only the sovereign could regulate and direct his armed forces.
This relationship between the sovereign and members of the military is even more
clearly demonstrated by the Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GPW)17 that was completed in Geneva immediately after World War II. In Article
4, the signatories defined who could be granted prisoner of war status, effectively deter-
mining who would qualify as lawful combatants in armed conflict between sovereigns.Is
Notably, Article 4 did not describe everyone who would be on the modern battlefield; ,119
but it clearly delineated those on the battlefield who the sovereign invested as his agents.
115. See International Committee of the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/
57JNVP for a concise history of Dunant, including the Battle of Solferino.
116. See id.
117. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in SCHINDLER & Tos, AN, supra note 109, at 430-31.
1 I. See id. (quoting Article 4). Article 4 reads:.
A. Prisoners of War, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil [sic) the follow-
ing conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power.
Id.
119. For example, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument) outlaws the use of mercenaries. There is also an intense
academic discussion on the role of contractors on the battlefield and what privileges and immunities they
deserve. See Geoffrey S. Coin, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilians Augmentees, the Law of Armed Conflict,
and the Search for a More Effective Test for Defining Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions (2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=895525; Private Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 109th Congress (Oct.
2, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/93191.htm; Christopher J. Mandernach, Warriors
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These agreements, combined with state practice, clearly illustrate that since the state
has been the preeminent unit in international law, it is the sovereign who has exercised
control over the military and provided regulation and direction for each nation's military.
Because of this role for the sovereign , the military functions as the agent of the sovereign;
therefore, it is the sovereign who determines when a soldier is punishable for acts con-
ducted while on the sovereign's mission.
C. CRIMINAL LIABILrTY OF THE SOVEREIGN'S MILITARY
In Judge Gargani's opinion, he argued that the "law of the flag" trumps other forms of
jurisdiction over armed forces during armed conflict.12° This assertion grows naturally
from the previous section's determination that, as the sovereign's agent, the military
forces receive direction and regulation from the sovereign. Because the military functions
at the behest of the sovereign, and within the direction and regulation the sovereign sets
for it, it only makes sense that the sovereign also cloaks its armed forces with privileges
and immunities resulting from that agency. It is from this reasoning that the well-estab-
lished "law of the flag" originates. 121
One of the most noted and also well-established privileges and immunities that the
sovereign grants to his armed forces is combatant immunity-immunity from prosecution
for otherwise criminal acts such as killing another-so long as they remain within their
sovereign's regulation and direction. Indeed, the great benefit to falling within the previ-
ously mentioned Article 4 of GPW, is the grant of combatant immunity. 22 A state that
has granted combatant immunity to its military members is responsible for ensuring that
those military members conform to the law of armed conflict. If they do not, the State has
the obligation to take appropriate action. 123
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With that obligation to take appropriate action comes the exclusive authority to remove
that immunity. This principle is confirmed not only in state practice but also in applicable
international agreements. For example, the Model United Nations Status of Forces
Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations 24 states that if participating nation peacekeepers
are suspected of having committed offenses, including war crimes, they "shall be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States." 125 Judge Gargani
chronicled a list of other precedents on this issue that could also be raised in support of
this principle of international law.
It may be argued that the International Criminal Tribunals and the International Crimi-
nal Court have removed that exclusive status of the sovereign state. This paper, however,
only deals with the exclusive right vis a vis other domestic sovereigns. Under the U.N.
Charter, 126 the Security Council has the responsibility to maintain international peace and
security, 127 and each member state has agreed. 128 Therefore, if the Security Council de-
termines that it is necessary to establish an international criminal tribunal to further inter-
national peace and security, each domestic sovereign has agreed to comply. Further,
member states of the International Criminal Court have done likewise. 129 In each of these
cases, the sovereign has acceded to this exception to its complete sovereignty over its
armed forces.
This section demonstrates that the armed forces of a nation are the agent of the sover-
eign, who directs and regulates those forces and has the obligation to ensure compliance
with those directions and international law. Concordant with that obligation comes the
authority to grant privileges and immunities, including combatant immunity to actions
during armed conflict. This authority is exclusive.
IV. Military Immunity from Passive Personality Jurisdiction
Given the prior analysis, it is now possible to examine Judge Gargani's judgment in
Lozano. At the outset, it is important to remember that this trial grew out of combatant
acts that occurred during an armed conflict, and that the combatant's sovereign deter-
mined that there was no wrongdoing. Judge Gargani's ruling was that Italy could not
exercise passive personality jurisdiction over a U.S. soldier who had killed an Italian na-
tional during an armed conflict where the United States had taken cognizance of the oc-
currence and, as the soldier's sovereign, taken the action it deemed appropriate.
A. PASSIVE PERSONALITY VERSUS LAW OF THE FLAG
Judge Gargani correctly analyzed the superiority of the law of the flag over a jurisdic-
tional claim of passive personality. Indeed, Judge Gargani may have given the passive
personality principle too much credit by refusing to allow for a hierarchy between com-
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peting theories of jurisdiction. Currently, while acceptance of passive personality appears
to be increasing throughout the world, its most common uses are limited to specific, uni-
versally abhorrent crimes such as terrorism and hostage -taking. Many other proposals for
use of passive personality jurisdiction exist and are receiving attention in various countries,
but few commentators have argued that passive personality jurisdiction would trump more
traditional theories of territoriality and nationality when states with these claims step for-
ward to take action.
In comparison, the law of the flag is still a very viable and supported theory in both state
practice and international agreement. As Judge Gargani pointed out, in recent armed
conflicts, nations have functioned under the implied and expressed view that jurisdiction
over armed forces during an armed conflict rested exclusively with the sending state. The
Model United Nations Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations further
confirms this precept, as do other international agreements such as the U.N. Security
Council Resolutions.
One possible exception to this rule would be if the flag state took no cognizance of the
occurrence. Speaking of passive personality jurisdiction as opposed to territoriality or na-
tionality jurisdiction, Professor Watson argued that "if neither the state in which the
crime occurred nor the offender's home state prosecutes, they should not have reason to
complain if the victim's home state then desires to prosecute." 30 Regardless of whether
this might be true, it is not applicable here because the United States did take cognizance
of the event and so informed Italy.
B. SOVEREIGN DETERMINATION CONCLUSIVE
Not only did the United States take cognizance of the issue, but as Judge Gargani ac-
knowledged, U.S. authorities conducted a combined investigation of the event with Italian
authorities. Although the joint investigative team came to two different conclusions, it is
clear from the facts that the United States was fully engaged in the circumstances and that,
as the sovereign of the soldier in question, it took the action it deemed appropriate. This
much is clear from Judge Gargani's statement that the U.S. Department of State commu-
nicated to the government of Italy that it deemed the case closed.131
These facts and actions were sufficient for Judge Gargani to deem that the United
States, as the sovereign exercising law of the flag jurisdiction over Lozano, had determined
there was no criminal liability. In fact, Judge Gargani made clear that the U.S. decision
not to prosecute SPC Lozano "cannot give rise to the conclusion that, on the basis of that
legal system, no jurisdiction had been exercised."132
As before, international law and state practice support Judge Gargani's decision. As the
sovereign and grantor of privileges and immunities to its agents, the United States' deter-
mination concerning the actions of a military member in the course of an armed conflict
are determinative and cannot be second-guessed by the victim's state. With the authority
and obligation of the sovereign to ensure compliance by its armed forces, comes the exclu-
sive power to determine criminal liability.
130. Watson, nupra note 27, at 21.
131. Lozano, supra note 1, at 5.
132. Id. at 19.
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V. Conclusion
Judge Gargani's decision that Italy could not exercise jurisdiction over SPC Lozano was
correct. Absent another applicable international agreement, the exercise of passive per-
sonality criminal jurisdiction over a combatant for combatant acts is inappropriate when
the combatant's sovereign is seized of the case.
Does this determination leave Italy with no recourse when one of its citizens is the
victim in these tragic circumstances? Perhaps. However, there are some alternatives that
Italy could choose to pursue. Because this is a matter of sovereignty, the victim's nation
must pursue remedies through political means, rather than judicial means. The victim's
state could use a number of political actions to put pressure on the combatant's nation to
take more direct action against the combatant, including the entire spectrum from a de
marche to direct sanctions.133 The victim's nation could also approach the Security Coun-
cil and ask them to take cognizance of the occurrence, which would likely have limited
success in the present case, or could refer the event to the International Criminal Court if
both states are members. The victim's state might then seek extradition, consent to try the
combatant and provide required assurances to the combatant's state that the combatant
would be treated fairly, or offer to allow the combatant to raise combatant immunity as an
affirmative defense. It is even possible that some combatants in SPC Lozano's position
would desire the opportunity themselves to resolve the situation.
The victim's state also has other solutions available. The victim's state might seek a
financial remuneration, along the lines of a claim or an ex gratia payment, for the death of
the victim to be paid to the victim's family. There may be no need for an admission of
guilt on the part of the combatant's state but merely a financial expression of condolence
over the tragic event. Finally, the victim's state might refuse to participate in military
operations with the combatant's state without some prior agreement to address similar
situations in the future. Such an action might provide sufficient incentive for the combat-
ant's sovereign but would also likely require a reciprocal promise.
Importantly, all of these proposed solutions are political solutions, not judicial solu-
tions. A soldier such as SPC Lozano, who was acting as the agent of his sovereign and was
determined by his sovereign to have acted appropriately in the circumstances, ought not
to be subject to Italy's domestic criminal process via passive personality jurisdiction nor
should he be tried in absentia. Neither Judge Gargani, nor any judge acting appropriately
under international law, ought to allow such proceedings to occur.
133. Such actions are contemplated in Article 149 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War,. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 149, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3365.
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